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Abstract 
Shadow credit market is a credit creation market which is parallel to the bank credit market. It has the function of credit 
creation, liquidity conversion and maturity transformation. In this paper, based on the different participants of shadow 
credit market, we divides it to the dealer, formal financial institution and private lending credit markets and measures 
the scale of shadow credit market. Based on the monthly data from year 2006 to 2014, by constructing VAR model, the 
paper attempts to analyze the macroeconomic effect of the shadow credit market financing. The research results show, 
firstly, shadow credit market as a way of resource allocation, has certain positive effect in meeting the needs of social 
investment and financing and promoting economic growth. Secondly, shadow credit market has changed the traditional 
money supply model and transmission mechanism of monetary policy, expanding the money supply and weakening the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. Thirdly, the shadow credit market impact the price level through influencing credit 
market scale and money supply. 
Keywords: shadow credit market, monetary policy, non-observed revenue, macroeconomic effect 
1. Introduction  
After the 2008 economic crisis, the Chinese government launched the 4 trillion economic stimulus plan, bank credit 
scale expanded rapidly. In promoting economic growth at the same time, also led to asset price bubbles and high 
inflation pressure brought by the expansion of credit. So since 2010, China’s financial authorities began tightening 
credit. Bank credit crunch promoted the development of the shadow credit market. On the one hand, traditional 
financial institutions in the face of the low lever pressure began to innovate, bank financial products, money market 
funds scale expanded rapidly; on the other hand, private lending enterprises arose under the condition of money supply 
and demand unbalance, providing funds for capital demanders to make up money supply and demand gap. In recent 
years, China’s shadow credit market is developing rapidly. From 2006 to 2014, social financing scale increased from 
4.2696 trillion yuan to 16.4133 trillion yuan, but RMB loans accounted for the proportion of social financing scale 
decreased from 73.83% to 59.59%. Shadow credit market have characteristics of credit creation ability and is basically 
not effected by national economic policy adjustment. Therefore, strengthen the supervision of the shadow credit market, 
build effective macro regulatory become a top priority of China regulatory authorities. 
Shadow credit market is outside the banking supervision, providing liquidity to the market. Shadow credit market, as 
the supplement of traditional credit market, is also a means of resource allocation. Shadow credit market has the 
functions of credit creation, liquidity conversion and maturity transformation, it has impact on economic growth, price 
level and money supply. The final product and service value created by small and medium-sized enterprises account for 
60% in gross domestic product which means small and medium enterprises play an important role in increasing 
employment, but the traditional commercial banks exist serious problem of credit rationing which makes it hard for 
small and medium-sized enterprises to obtain financing from the traditional credit market, shadow credit market 
provides a good financing environment, promoting economic growth. Compared with commercial bank loans, the 
special lending mechanism of shadow credit market has also led to greater market risk. Therefore, shadow credit market 
is a “double-edged sword” role to economic development. On the one hand, its flexible refinancing function can 
alleviate the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises. On the other hand, once encountered 
economic recession or counterparty risk problems, the transfer of risk and the negative impact on the economy would 
probably be more severe. 
The development of shadow credit market will also affect the central bank’s monetary policy. The influence of shadow 
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credit market on monetary policy reacts in two aspects. First, the existence of shadow credit market has changed the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism, making the central bank monetary control policy cannot pass into the real 
economy as expectation, the effect of monetary policy will be limited. Second, shadow credit market as the supplement 
of traditional credit market has changed the traditional monetary supply model, thus affect the money supply. Especially 
after 2008, shadow credit market develop rapidly, its characteristics of opaque market transaction, high risk relevance 
and weak internal regulation, making measure the scale accurately and explore the macroeconomic effect of shadow 
credit market financing have an important significance in strengthening the effectiveness of monetary policy and 
improving the macroeconomic stability. 
In the process of research, based on the different participants of shadow credit market, we divided it to the dealer, 
formal financial institution and private lending credit market. Measure shadow credit market scale from 2006 to 2014 
respectively and construct VAR model to analyze the macroeconomic effect of shadow credit market financing on 
economic growth, price level and monetary policy. 
2. Measurement of shadow credit market scale  
2.1 Definition of credit market 
Shadow credit market is a lending market, small loan company, pawnshops, P2P, network finance company, chamber of 
commerce,ect are credit suppliers, small and medium-sized enterprises, individual businesses, framers and natural 
person, ect are capital demanders
[1]
. The biggest difference between the shadow credit market and the traditional 
lending market is the participant. The participant of the traditional credit market is commercial bank, it provide liquidity 
to the market through issuing loans. The participants of the shadow credit market are divided into three categories, the 
first type is dealer market, credit market products contain government support agency bonds, commercial paper, super 
commercial paper, collective enterprise bonds, small and medium-sized enterprise collective notes, medium-term notes, 
asset-backed securities, asset-backed paper and money market funds, ect. The second type is formal financial institution, 
mainly operate bank financing, trust financial products, securities company financial products , insurance company 
financial products and financial leasing business. The third type is private lending market. Participants mainly conclude 
small loan company, private capital management company, pawnshop, P2P, crowdfunding company, internet finance 
company, ect. 
Shadow credit market tools may be loan contract, may also be other debt instruments, such as entrust investment 
agreement and financial agreement. Shadow credit market has the function of credit creation, but the central bank is 
hard to regulate it using monetary policy tools. The development of the shadow credit market is driven mainly by two 
factors. First, national bank have serious credit rationing problem, financing demand of small and medium-sized 
enterprises is difficult to be satisfied by traditional credit market. Under the condition of bank credit quota restrictions 
and bond market strong external financing constraints, small and medium-sized enterprises can obtain financing from 
shadow credit market. Second, under the external environment of financial innovation, market competition and lack of 
supervision, the traditional institution are gradually involved in the shadow credit market. 
2.2 Measurement of shadow credit market  
At present, some domestic and foreign literature put forward measuring method of the scale of shadow banking system, 
but there is still no perfect and standard measuring system. The measurement of shadow credit market should not only 
estimate the scale of the shadow banking system, but also estimate the scale of private lending. However, private 
lending is mostly underground, strong concealment, so the measurement data of this part is hard to obtain. Pei ping and 
Yin Wen
[2]
 summed new entrusted loans, trust loans, no discount bank acceptance bill and corporate bond holdings to 
estimate the scale of shadow banking credit creation increment. Zhang Shiqiang (2013) aggregated credit scale of bank 
financial products, entrusted loans, trust loans, small loan companies, private equity funds and pawnshops to estimate 
the scale of shadow banking system 
[3]
. 
In this paper, based on the different participants of shadow credit market, we divide it to the dealer, formal financial 
institution and private lending credit market, and measure the scale of shadow credit market. The dealer shadow credit 
market is the market shadow credit market, mainly include super commercial paper, commercial paper, medium-term 
notes, government support agency bonds, small and medium-sized enterprise collective debt, asset-backed paper and 
asset-backed securities. The shadow credit market scale of formal financial institution can be estimated from capital 
source and fund operation angles. From the perspective of funding source, mainly contain bank financing and trust; 
from the perspective of funding operation, mainly contain entrusted loans, trust loans and no discount bills. Private 
lending shadow credit market conclude two kinds of participants, one kind include small loan companies, pawnshops, 
financing guarantee companies and private equity firms, this kind of participants is not licensed and insufficiently 
regulation. Another kind is private lending institutions, containing P2P companies, internet finance company, 
crowdfunding, chamber of commerce, private bank. This type of participants is not licensed and without supervision. 
Applied Economics and Finance                                          Vol. 3, No. 3; 2016 
160 
 
Because the private lending has extremely strong concealment, data are difficult to measure from the microscopic view, 
so this paper use the method of Li Jianjun(2008) non-observed finance to estimate the scale of private lending shadow 
credit market
[4]
. 
Measurement of scale of private lending credit market rely on the non-observed economy scale. Non-observed economy 
scale is economic output achieved by the capital poured by quasi financial institutions, not by bank, security companies 
and other traditional financial institutions. It refers to the production activities that should be included in the national 
economic accounting, but have not been accounted by the national economic accounting system. Non-observed 
economy scale can be reflected by non-observed revenue. Although non-observed revenue is hidden, but it will perform 
in the fund occupation of consumption, investment, net export and monetary saving in the end. From the point of 
spending, GDP is constituted by consumption (CUM), capital formation (CAF) and net exports (NEX). GDP add net 
foreign initial distribution (NFI) is gross national product (GNP). Gross national product (GNP) add net foreign often 
transfer income (NFT) is national disposable income (KNI), have the following corresponding relation. 
GDP=CUM+CAF+NEX                                                  (1) 
GNP=GDP+NFI=CUM+CAF+NEX+NFI                                         (2)                                                                  
KNI=GNP+NFT=CUM+CAF+NEX+NFI+NFT                                     (3) 
The balance of payments account records regular economic transactions between domestic residents and non-residents. 
Credit records economic transaction activity of capital inflow, debit records the economic transaction activity of capital 
outflow. So the current-account balance（CUBOP）calculation formula is as follows： 
CUBOP=NEX+NFT+NFI                                               (4)                                                                
KNI=CUM+CAF+CUBOP                                              (5) 
National saving (NS) is national disposal income deduct consumption, namely 
NS=KNI-CUM                                                   (6) 
In a closed economy, national savings plus net capital transfer (NCT), excluding capital formation (CAF) is monetary 
savings (MS). But in an open economy, the domestic monetary savings may outflow, including foreign direct 
investment, securities investment and other investment. The net difference between the inflow of external savings and 
outflow of national savings is net external savings, is also financial account balance (FABOP). 
MS=CUBOP+NCT                                                   (7) 
MS=KNI-CUM+NCT-CAF+NFS                                           (8) 
Therefore, the increase or decrease quantity of a country’s cash and deposit is different from monetary savings, so exist 
non-observed finance and non-observed revenue. 
NOE=ΔC+ΔD-MS                                                   (9) 
NOE=ΔC+ΔD-KNI+CUM-NCT+CAF-NFS                                    (10) 
On the basis of non-observed revenue, we can measure the scale of private lending, because the scale of non-observed 
loan has close relationship with non-observed revenue. As a result, we assume the loan support ratio of non-observed 
economic activities is the same with the economic activity which can be calculated. Based on bank loans, non-observed 
revenue and gross domestic product can estimated the scale of private lending from 1982 to 2014. 
L
GDP
NOE
NOL                                   (11) 
Table 1, 2, and 3 respectively measure the scale of dealer, formal financial institution and private lending credit market. 
Table 4 aggregate three kinds of shadow credit market to calculate the scale of shadow credit market. We can see from 
table 1 that there is an upward trend in the scale of dealer credit market year by year, commercial paper, medium-term 
notes, government support securities have lager contribution to the expansion of scale of dealer credit market, super 
commercial paper and asset-backed securities expand rapidly. The scale of formal financial institution credit market is 
shown in table 2, from perspective of funding source, the size of non-guaranteed bank financial products increase from 
530 billion to 15.02 trillion yuan, trust products increase from 71.137 to 1587.529 billion yuan from 2007 to 2014, 
Therefore, from the perspective of funding source, the scale of formal financial institution credit market is rising. From 
the perspective of capital operation, the size of entrusted loans, trust loans and no discount bills show a general 
ascending trend except a slight decline in 2014. Table 3 shows that scale of private lending has a significant upward 
tendency, the scale of private lending is at round 32.74 billion yuan in 1982 and rise to 12801.78 billion yuan in 2014. 
We obtain the scale of shadow credit market by aggregating the scale of three types of credit market. From table 4, we 
can see from 2007 to 2014, the scale of shadow credit market rise from 4212.919 billion yuan to 22094.698 billion yuan, 
in 7 years, the scale of shadow credit market expand 5 times. It is thus obvious that shadow credit market has been an 
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important part of the credit market, and in the continuous development. 
Table1.The scale of dealer shadow credit market 
year SCP CP 
medium-term 
notes 
government 
support 
agency bonds 
enterprise 
collective 
debt 
enterprise 
collective 
notes 
ABN ABS 
2007  0 3203.10  0 0 0 0 0 324.05 
2008 0 4203.10  1672 0 0 0 0 551.06 
2009 0 4561.05  8622 0 0 12.65 0 398.58 
2010 0 6530.35  13536 1090 20.98 55.12 0 182.32 
2011 0 5023.50  19742.7 1090 35.16 93.68 0 95.27 
2012 3531 8326.97  24922 1090 34.82 187.66 57 268.90 
2013 4729 8244.20  28839.5 10050 32.99 190.83 97.8 354.27 
2014 6999.5 10365.90  31783.1 11675 83.67 142.49 171.4 2751.14 
Data source: Shang Hai clearing house、China Central Depository and Clearing Corporation unit: hundred million yuan                                                        
Table 2. The scale of formal financial institution shadow credit market 
Year 
Capital source Capital operation 
Non-guaranteed bank 
financial products 
Trust 
products 
 Entrusted  
loans 
Trust  
loans 
No discount  
bills 
2007 5300 711．37 1702  3371  6701  
2008 8700 1115.87 3144  4262  1064  
2009 17000 1663.86 4364  6780  4606  
2010 28000 3607．36 3865  8748  23346  
2011 45900 8470．04 2034  12962  10271  
2012 71000 12499.29 12845  12838  10499  
2013 102100 13869.64 18404  25466  7755  
2014 150200 15875.29 5174  25069  -1286  
Data source：wind database unit: hundred million yuan 
Table 3. The scale of private lending shadow credit market 
year GDPi KNI NOE NOE/GDP L NOL 
1982 5323.4 5339.7  548.0  10.30% 3180.6 327.4  
1983 5962.7 5995.7  692.0  11.61% 3589.9 416.6  
1984 7208.1 7254.0  1195.4  16.58% 4766.1 790.4  
1985 9016.0 9047.9  1233.0  13.68% 5905.6 807.6  
1986 10275.2 10287.4  1833.3  17.84% 7590.8 1354.3  
1987 12058.6 12059.0  1824.7  15.13% 9032.5 1366.8  
1988 15042.8 15052.4  2271.6  15.10% 10551.3 1593.3  
1989 16992.3 17015.3  2443.7  14.38% 14306.1 2057.4  
1990 18667.8 18731.4  3477.2  18.63% 17680.7 3293.3  
1991 21781.5 21870.4  4261.7  19.57% 21337.8 4174.9  
1992 26923.5 27001.0  6850.2  25.44% 26322.9 6697.4  
1993 35333.9 35327.6  8624.5  24.41% 32943.1 8041.0  
1994 48197.9 48223.7  10845.5  22.50% 39976 8995.4  
1995 60793.7 59930.3  13034.4  21.44% 50544.1 10836.9  
1996 71176.6 70319.5  14691.7  20.64% 61156.6 12623.5  
1997 78973.0 78079.5  13295.5  16.84% 74914.1 12612.2  
1998 84402.3 83378.5  14381.2  17.04% 86524.1 14742.8  
1999 89677.1 88598.2  14689.1  16.38% 93734.3 15353.6  
2000 99214.6 98522.8  13899.6  14.01% 99371.1 13921.5  
2001 109655.2 108771.1  15902.8  14.50% 112314.7 16288.5  
2002 120332.7 120170.4  23427.8  19.47% 139802.9 27218.5  
2003 135822.8 136436.5  32454.0  23.89% 169771 40565.8  
2004 159878.3 161348.8  21304.1  13.33% 188565.6 25126.8  
2005 184937.4 185696.9  35008.6  18.93% 206838.5 39154.5  
2006 216314.3 218232.0  38658.4  17.87% 238279.8 42583.9  
2007 265810.3 269362.3  25675.1  9.66% 277746.5 26828.0  
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2008 314045.4 319211.1  46721.6  14.88% 320048.7 47614.7  
2009 340902.8 342478.1  110439.0  32.40% 425596.6 137876.5  
2010 401512.8 402458.2  81870.5  20.39% 509223 103833.2  
2011 473104.1 469676.8  99544.5  21.04% 581892.5 122434.3  
2012 519410.1 518379.7  121251.6  23.34% 629909.4 147046.7  
2013 588018.7 582656.7  102787.7  17.48% 766326.64 133956.6  
2014 636138.8 632175.8  93835.8  14.75% 867867.89 128017.8  
Data source: National statistics yearbook unit: hundred million yuan 
Table 4 .The scale of shadow credit market       
year dealer Formal financial institution 
Private 
lending 
Shadow credit market 
2007 3527.15  11774.00  26828.0  42129.19  
2008 6426.16  8470.00  47614.7  62510.87  
2009 13594.28  15750.00  137876.5  167220.74  
2010 21414.77  35959.00  103833.2  161206.96  
2011 26080.31  25267.00  122434.3  173781.61  
2012 38418.35  36182.00  147046.7  221647.01  
2013 52538.59  51625.00  133956.6  238120.16  
2014 63972.20  28957.00  128017.8  220946.98  
Data source: Shang Hai clearing house、National statistics yearbook、author calculate unit: hundred million yuan 
3. The generation mechanism of macroeconomic effect of shadow credit market financing 
3.1 The effect of shadow credit market financing on national economic growth 
China has existed bank credit rationing problem for a long term, formal financial institutions have serious credit 
discrimination. Especially since 2010, China’s financial authorities began further credit tightening. At this time, shadow 
credit market appeared to provide liquidity to small and medium-sized enterprises, eased the problem of the bankruptcy 
of small and medium-sized enterprises due to liquidity shortage. Shadow credit market and traditional credit market 
both have the function of credit creation, liquidity conversion, maturity transformation, and can improve the efficiency 
of resource allocation. But shadow credit market has the characteristics of high leverage, complicated product structure, 
opaque market transactions and lack of regulation which will increase the vulnerability of financial system and 
macroeconomic volatility. Liu Rongmao, Jiang Yi found that shadow banking system has significant influence on 
economic growth and price stability
[5]
. Shen Yue(2013) used macro fund flow analysis to estimate the scale of shadow 
banking system and found there is only one-way causal relationship between the scale of shadow banking system and 
economic growth, economic growth will stimulate the expansion of shadow banking system, but on the contrary, the 
promoting effect of shadow banking system on economic growth is not significant
[6]
.Rydstrom(2007) pointed that 
shadow banking system is a typical financial innovation induced by bank off-balance-sheet activities, and has played an 
active role in the development of entity economy
[7]
.Gennaioli(2011) argued that banks can bring the improvement of 
benefits, but when investors ignore tail risk, risk loans will appear vulnerability and liquidity risk
[8]
.  
Therefore, the development of shadow credit market is a “double-edged sword”. On the one hand, the development of 
shadow credit market is conductive to economic growth, it can make up the traditional lending market liquidity shortage. 
When commercial banks can’t satisfy the market financing demand because risk and return doesn’t match or external 
regulatory restrictions, shadow credit market can relieve the market environment of currency supply and demand 
imbalance through innovative products and risk diversification arrangements. On the other hand, shadow credit market 
may trigger financial risks. Shadow credit market products have the characteristics of high leverage, implement assets 
and liabilities management based on the value of risk. So, in the case of falling asset value, shadow credit market have 
to deleverage. The price of the risky assets will decline with institutional investors selling assets, causing financial 
market turbulence and liquidity squeeze, even lead to market credit crisis. Turmoil in the financial markets will also 
inevitably lead to economic recession, having a negative effect on the financial system and macroeconomic stability. 
Moreover, the development of shadow credit market may aggravate industry hollowing problem, and hit the real 
economy. Since the borrowing cost and risk of shadow credit market is higher than traditional credit market, some large 
enterprises can obtain low interest loans from the traditional credit market, then transfer capital to fund demanders 
though shadow credit market to earn interest margin. This risk-free arbitrage will make enterprise invest more energy 
and capital in private lending and gradually divorce from the entity industry. Therefore, the influence of shadow credit 
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market on the economic growth is reflected in two aspects. On the one hand, its flexible refinancing function can 
promote the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, and improve the efficiency of capital allocation. On 
the other hand, when economy is suffering from systemic risk, the negative impact of the transfer of risk on the 
economy also shouldn’t be ignored.  
3.2 The effect of shadow credit market financing on price level  
Price level is one of the most important observation variables, it reflects the relationship between total supply and total 
demand, mainly affected by credit and money supply changes. The goal of the government in the formulation of 
macroeconomic policy is not only to realize economic growth, more to maintain price stability. When effective demand 
is lower than the effective supply, price will decline, at this point, expand credit will increase total social investment 
level and total demand, price level will increase until it reaches an equilibrium level. When the actual economic 
operation level exceeds potential supply capacity of the national economy, price will rise because demand relative to 
supply is too high. At this time, reduce credit scale will help to reduce social demand level, price level will decline until 
it reaches an equilibrium state of aggregate demand equals aggregate supply. Therefore, the scale of shadow credit 
market will have certain disturbance on the price level though influencing the social credit scale.  
3.3 The effect of shadow credit market financing on monetary policy 
Shadow credit market has positive effect on China’s financial deepening and solving the small and medium-sized 
enterprise financing difficulties. Shadow credit market expand rapidly and its operation mode of independent of 
monetary policy system has great influence on the credit market. Wang Zengwu(2010)
[9] 
has discussed the effect of 
shadow banking system on money supply taking commercial bank financial products as an example, and put forward 
that shadow banking system make money supply will be much higher than credit ceiling set by the central bank, 
interfering central bank monetary policy objectives. The study of Gertler and Kiyotaki(2010) found that non-bank 
financial institutions have function of amplification effects in the conduction process of macroeconomic shocks
[10]
. 
Andrew Sheng used a large number of data to prove that shadow banking system has an amplified effect on money 
supply 
[11]
. The effect of shadow credit market on monetary policy mainly lies in two aspects. On the one hand, shadow 
credit market has the function of credit creation, it has increased the supply of credit, and expanded the money supply. 
On the other hand, shadow credit market has impact on monetary policy transmission mechanism, the traditional 
monetary policy transmission mechanism is weakened and distorted, thus affecting the effectiveness of monetary policy, 
increasing the difficulty of central bank monetary operation mechanism. 
Shadow credit market as the supplement of the traditional credit market can partly replace credit creation function of 
traditional credit market, and increase the supply of credit. China’s monetary policy is mainly based on quantitative 
control for a long time. The central bank acts on the commercial banking system by adjusting the base currency and 
monetary multiplier to realize the regulation of credit and money supply. The absence of shadow credit market 
supervision making central bank can’t adjust monetary multiplier by adjusting the reserve requirements, bank saving 
deposits is transferred to shadow credit market in various forms, financial disintermediation happens, internal deposits 
of commercial banks decline, these all lead to the monetary multiplier amplification and increase money supply.  
China’s monetary policy transmission mainly relies on credit channel and interest rate channel. From the perspective of 
credit transmission mechanism, shadow credit market is mostly credit chain business model and beyond the central 
bank’s regulation. During the economic boom, the scale of shadow credit market expand excessively, during the 
economic recession, the scale excessive contraction, leading to the deviation of money supply and weakening the effect 
of central bank’s monetary control. From the point of interest rate channel, the shadow credit market interest rate is 
higher than the general interest rate, more able to reflect the supply and demand of funds in the credit market. Thus, the 
existence of shadow credit market may lead to the restriction of interest rate adjustment function and is not conductive 
to the transmission of monetary policy, having a negative impact on the effects of monetary policy. 
4. Econometric model setting  
4.1 Variable Selection 
In this paper, we will study the influence of the shadow credit market on China’s national economic growth, price level 
and monetary policy. Select the following indicators. 
Economic growth: Since 2004, China’s National Bureau of Statistics no longer publish monthly data. Therefore this 
article use “quarterly GDP data/ quarterly industrial added value data=corresponding monthly GDP data/ corresponding 
monthly industrial added value data”, convert quarterly GDP to monthly GDP data, we use month-on-month GDP 
growth rate RGDP as the indicator. 
Price level: in this paper, use month-on-month CPI growth rate RCPI to measure the changes in the price level. 
Money supply: the variable on behalf of the money supply is mainly M0, M1 and M2, according to the division of 
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China’s money supply, narrow money supply can more reflect the changes of residents and enterprises tightness of 
money. We choose month-on-month M1 growth rate RM1 as the indicator. 
The scale of shadow credit market: according to the different participants, we divide shadow credit market to the dealer, 
formal financial institution and private lending credit market. We sum entrusted loans, trust loans and no discount bills 
to estimate formal financial institution credit market. The estimation of private lending credit market is the annual data 
by using the method of non-observed finance, then convert annual data to monthly data according to monthly GDP and 
annual GDP ratio. Use month-on-month growth rate of three types of shadow credit market (RTSM、RFSM、RPSM) to 
conduct empirical study. 
In this paper, the data source is Shanghai clearing house, China Central Depository and Clearing Corporation, wind 
database and national statistical yearbook, all the data are based on monthly data, the time span is from January 2006 to 
December 2014. 
4.2 Model selection  
In the analysis of the dynamic relationship between economic variables, VAR model has been widely used, it takes each 
variable as the lag period of all endogenous variables in the system to construct model. VAR model is often used to 
forecast the interconnected time series systems and analysis the influence of random disturbance on variables, so as to 
reveal the effect of economic shock on economic variables. In this paper, we study the impact of shadow credit market 
on economic growth, price level and monetary policy, and research the mutual influence among them. Therefore, we 
use VAR model to analyze the macroeconomic effect of shadow credit market financing.  
4.3 Stationary test  
Due to many economic variables are non-stationary data, in the process of modeling, we need to test the stability of the 
economic time series. If all the reciprocal of the roots is less than 1, then the model is stable. Only this model is stable, 
the conclusion obtained by VAR model is valid. As shown in table 5, all the reciprocal of the roots is less than 1, VAR 
system satisfies stability condition.  
 
Figure 1. AR diagram 
Table 5.AR table  
Root Modulus 
-0.186084 - 0.549909i 0.580541 
-0.186084 + 0.549909i 0.580541 
0.332446 - 0.418603i 0.534554 
0.332446 + 0.418603i 0.534554 
0.423931 - 0.236480i 0.485428 
0.423931 + 0.236480i 0.485428 
-0.475791 0.475791 
-0.230284 - 0.230951i 0.326142 
-0.230284 + 0.230951i 0.326142 
-0.292033 - 0.052941i 0.296792 
-0.292033 + 0.052941i 0.296792 
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4.4 The choice of lag phase in VAR model 
Table 6. The choice of lag phase  
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 472.7917  NA  2.66E-12 -9.624572  -9.46531*  -9.56017* 
1 519.6045  86.86908  2.13E-12 -9.847516 -8.732692 -9.396736 
2 556.4120  63.74901  2.12e-12*  -9.86416* -7.793778 -9.027002 
3 571.7172  24.61461  3.31E-12 -9.437468 -6.411519 -8.213923 
4 586.6212  22.12555  5.33E-12 -9.002499 -5.020988 -7.392571 
5 610.1736  32.05069  7.37E-12 -8.745848 -3.808773 -6.749537 
6 626.0193  19.60291  1.24E-11 -8.330295 -2.437657 -5.947601 
7 656.0383  33.42323  1.63E-11 -8.206976 -1.358775 -5.437899 
8 680.5412  24.25030  2.57E-11 -7.969922 -0.166159 -4.814462 
9 718.1276  32.54906  3.36E-11 -8.002632 0.756694 -4.460789 
10 794.8719   56.96484* 2.20E-11 -8.842720 0.872169 -4.914495 
According to the AIC and FPE test, the optimal lagged term is 2 order. Thus, choose the VAR(2) model for subsequent 
analysis.  
4.5 Granger causality test 
Grange causality test is from the perspective of forecast, define the causal relationship between variables, to test 
whether variable X is the Granger cause of the change of variable Y. In the paper, six variables were tested by Granger 
causality and the results are shown in table 7.  
Table 7.Granger causality test 
Null hypothesis F prob conclusion 
RTSM is not the cause of RGDP 1.34604  0.5102  accept 
RGDP is not the cause of RTSM 1.87567  0.3915  accept 
RFSM is not the cause of RGDP 0.06740  0.9669  accept 
RGDP is not the cause of RFSM 23.28998  0.0000  reject 
RPSM is not the cause of RGDP 10.56551  0.0051  reject 
RGDP is not the cause of RPSM 12.08373  0.0024  reject 
RTSM is not the cause of RCPI 3.54152  0.1702  accept 
RCPI is not the cause of RTSM 3.32554  0.1896  accept 
RFSM is not the cause of RCPI 0.83585  0.6584  accept 
RCPI is not the cause of RFSM 0.12757  0.9382  accept 
RPSM is not the cause of RCPI 0.21537  0.8979  accept 
RCPI is not the cause of RPSM 0.82546  0.6618  accept 
RTSM is not the cause of RM1 4.65956  0.0973  accept 
RM1 is not the cause of RTSM 0.00962  0.9952  accept 
RFSM is not the cause of起 RM1 0.03111  0.9846  accept 
RM1 is not the cause of RFSM 1.15837  0.5604  accept 
RPSM is not the cause of RM1 0.10015  0.9512  accept 
RM1 is not the cause of RPSM 19.47690  0.0001  reject 
We can see that under the significant level of 5%, dealer credit market and economic growth have no causal relationship. 
Formal financial institution credit market is not the cause of GDP growth, but economic growth is the cause of the 
formal financial institution credit market. When economic growth, social financing demand is strong, but traditional 
RMB loan business of commercial banks is regulated by the central bank, credit expansion is restricted, so bank can 
only through bank financing and other off balance sheet business seeking profit, the scale of formal financial institution 
expand. Private lending credit market and GDP growth have a cause-effect relationship. On the one hand, economic 
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growth will lead to social financing demand increase, private lending as the provider of market liquidity, the scale of 
credit will also expand. On the other hand, private lending as the main body of credit creation, can ease the problems of 
financing difficulties of the small and medium-sized enterprises and promote employment, export, technology 
innovation and economic development. 
There is no causal relationship between price and three types of credit market. Therefore, shadow credit market have 
credit creation function, can increase liquidity supply, and has a certain impact on the price level, but it’s not the reason 
of price level changes. Similarity, the development of shadow credit market is promoted by financial innovation, market 
competition, bank credit rationing and other external factors, price is not the cause of shadow credit market. 
The development of credit market will change the traditional monetary supply model, increase the money supply and 
weaken the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, thus affecting the effectiveness of monetary policy. But dealer, 
formal financial institution, private lending credit market is not the cause of money supply. Because when central bank 
is setting monetary policy to achieve the specific goal, it is unable to observe the scale of shadow credit market 
effectively, so the development of shadow credit market will affect money supply, but it’s not the cause of changes in 
money supply. The changes of money supply is not the cause of dealer, formal financial institution credit market, but it 
is the cause of private lending credit market. Private lending credit market is influenced greatly by the credit policy of 
the traditional commercial bank. When commercial bank implement easy credit policy, money supply and market 
liquidity is sufficient, small and medium enterprise is more inclined to get loans from commercial banks, because 
commercial bank capital cost is less than private lending, the scale of private lending credit market will shrink. As a 
consequence, monetary policy is the cause of private lending credit market, but has no causal relationship with dealer 
and formal financial institution credit market. 
4.6 Impulse response function 
The basic idea of impulse response is to use time series model to analyze the effects between variables, investigating 
how the disturbance brought by a single variable spread to other variables, in order to reveal the dynamic relationship 
between variables. 
4.6.1 The impact of dealer, formal financial institution, private lending shadow credit market on economic growth 
Figure 2 show, when GDP growth rate is positive impacted by the dealer credit market, it decline in the second phase, 
the third period reach the maximum positive effect and then decline, the fourth period reach the maximum negative 
effect and then rise, after the fifth period tends to zero. The shock of formal financial institution on GDP growth rate is 
not obvious, it smoothly tend to zero after fourth period. GDP growth presents a positive effect when it is impacted by 
the private lending shadow credit market, and in the second phase reach the maximum, then the shock effect decrease 
rapidly and reach negative maximum in the third phase, after fourth period the shock effect tends to zero. The results of 
impulse response analysis show that dealer credit market has a negative effect on the economic growth in short-term, 
but in the long run, positive effect is more obvious. The impact of formal financial institution credit market on 
economic growth is week. Private lending credit market has the biggest impact on economic growth, in the short term, 
private lending credit market alleviate the problem of small and medium-sized enterprises financing difficulties, have 
significant positive impact on economic growth, but after the second period, the shock is negative and tends to zero 
after fourth period. As a result, the different participants of shadow credit market have different shock effect, the shock 
of formal financial institution is the weakest and of private lending is the strongest. Shadow credit market have a 
negative effect on economic growth, and also have a positive effect, is a “double-edged sword” role. 
 
Figure 2. The impact of dealer, formal financial institution, private lending shadow credit market on economic growth 
4.6.2 The impact of dealer, formal financial institution, private lending shadow credit market on price level 
As shown in figure 3, give dealer credit market positive shock at the initial moment, CPI presents a negative effect and 
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reach negative maximum at second period, rise slowly and reach positive maximum at the fourth period, and then slow 
down to zero, but greater than zero. The shock of formal financial institution on the price level is consistent with private 
lending credit market. Price level first rise, then decline, after the sixth period tend to zero, and greater than zero. It 
shows that the impact of three types of shadow credit market on price level is different. But in the long term, they all 
have positive effect on the price level. Thus, the development of shadow credit market will raise the price level. 
 
Figure 3. The impact of dealer, formal financial institution, private lending shadow credit market on price level 
4.6.3 The impact of dealer, formal financial institution, private lending shadow credit market on money supply 
Figure 4 illustrates, give dealer credit market a positive shock, M1 growth rate will rise, at the third period reach 
positive maximum, then decline and remain volatile, after the seventh period tend to zero. The shock of formal financial 
institution on M1 growth rate is fluctuating in small range in the first three periods, in the fourth period reach positive 
maximum, impact effect disappear after seven period. When M1 growth rate is shocked by private lending, in the short 
time will have a positive effect on the M1 growth rate, after the seventh period tend to zero. Therefore, the development 
of shadow credit market will result in the increase in money supply.  
 
Figure 4. The impact of dealer, formal financial institution, private lending shadow credit market on money supply 
4.7 Variance decomposition analysis 
Variance decomposition analysis is based on the analysis of the contribution of each structure variable on the 
endogenous changes, to further evaluate the importance of different structural impact. The article selects several 
important variables to undergo variance decomposition and set the lag order to 10. 
4.7.1 Variance decomposition of economic growth (RGDP) 
As can be seen from the table 8, the effect of dealer, formal financial institution, private lending credit market on the 
GDP growth rate show an increasing trend. The effect of dealer credit market on GDP growth rate achieve stability after 
the fifth period, is 2.05%.The effect of formal financial institution is the weakest, stabilize at around 0.0539% after the 
sixth period. The effect of private lending credit market is the largest, stabilize at 8.24% from the fourth period. The 
contribution of monetary policy and price level on the GDP growth respectively stabilize at 17.07% and 4.12% after the 
seventh period. Therefore, the development of shadow credit market indeed plays a promoted effect on economic 
growth and private lending credit market has the greatest impact on GDP growth. 
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Table 8. Variance decomposition of RGDP 
Lag  error RGDP RCPI RM1 RTSM RFSM RPSM 
1 0.671226 100 0．00000 0.00000 0．00000 0．00000 0．00000 
2 0.808317 72.31306 4.224499 15.96513 0.060148 0.037412 7.399752 
3 0.823521 69.67513 4.077079 17.29742 0.507904 0.044212 8.398248 
4 0.830662 68.56342 4.048536 17.08761 2.001449 0.043858 8.255120 
5 0.831465 68.48907 4.101470 17.06187 2.052765 0.049015 8.245811 
6 0.832281 68.51076 4.116339 17.03371 2.056622 0.052910 8.229663 
7 0.832677 68.45823 4.119923 17.07074 2.054670 0.053870 8.242565 
8 0.832754 68.44805 4.120210 17.07939 2.056115 0.053927 8.242311 
9 0.832777 68.44421 4.120781 17.07886 2.059622 0.053925 8.242607 
10 0.832781 68.44381 4.120912 17.07903 2.059756 0.053950 8.242546 
 
4.7.2 Variance decomposition of price level (RGPI) 
Table 9 shows that shadow credit market has certain contribution on the price growth rate, but contribution is not high. 
The influence of dealer credit market on the price growth rate stabilize at 2.7% after the sixth period. The contribution 
of formal financial institution and private lending credit market show an increasing trend, and contribution rate is 
respectively 0.429% and 0.32% after the seventh period. The contribution rate of money supply on price level is the 
biggest and have obvious lag effects, in the first period, it has no influence, after the third period is remained at 26.4%. 
The impact of economic on price level stabilize at 3.67% after the sixth period. Thus, the scale of shadow credit market 
has certain influence on the price level, but the impact is low. The price level is mainly explained by the change of 
money supply. 
 
Table 9.Variance decomposition of RCPI 
lag error RGDP RCPI RM1 RTSM RFSM RPSM 
1 0.004993 1.787146 98.21285 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0．00000 
2 0.005770 1.462432 75.03851 22.01061 1.076708 0.270058 0.141679 
3 0.006070 3.275380 67.95088 26.41321 1.785280 0.344750 0.230498 
4 0.006124 3.392379 66.82558 26.54984 2.552157 0.416306 0.263737 
5 0.006145 3.514222 66.65454 26.45188 2.688125 0.416579 0.274650 
6 0.006151 3.664593 66.52754 26.39859 2.700073 0.427183 0.282019 
7 0.006157 3.674235 66.43115 26.45078 2.699097 0.428660 0.316072 
8 0.006157 3.673988 66.42301 26.44725 2.701887 0.429154 0.324705 
9 0.006157 3.673878 66.42086 26.44656 2.704042 0.429170 0.325488 
10 0.006157 3.673865 66.42070 26.44646 2.704163 0.429239 0.325570 
 
4.7.3 Variance decomposition of money supply (RM1) 
As can be seen from table 10, the influence of dealer credit market on M1 growth rate begin apparently from the third 
period, after the third period, the contribution rate remain at around 4%. The impact of formal financial institution on 
M1 growth rate is weak in the first three period, in the long run, the effect is at around 0.11%. The impact of private 
lending credit market on M1 growth rate is weak in the first two period, the contribution rate rise to 0.279% from the 
third period and have a trend of increase along with time, in the tenth period the effect is about 0.425%. Therefore, the 
effect of three types of credit market all have obvious lag effect on the money supply, and show an increasing trend. 
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Table 10. Variance decomposition of RM1 
lag error RGDP RCPI RM1 RTSM RFSM RPSM 
1 0.022515 0.199788 6.538660 93.26155 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
2 0.023129 0.460595 6.303353 92.71378 0.495456 0.000564 0.026252 
3 0.023640 0.623948 6.072392 89.04631 3.971820 0.006961 0.278565 
4 0.023698 0.814023 6.107923 88.69485 4.000072 0.104579 0.278554 
5 0.023775 1.053542 6.202657 88.28130 4.001912 0.109820 0.350767 
6 0.023800 1.082253 6.215220 88.15604 4.014868 0.111488 0.420126 
7 0.023806 1.088966 6.219243 88.14275 4.013791 0.111459 0.423787 
8 0.023807 1.090085 6.218979 88.13367 4.020680 0.111501 0.425087 
9 0.023808 1.090195 6.218929 88.13271 4.021397 0.111677 0.425096 
10 0.023808 1.090553 6.219177 88.13179 4.021473 0.111675 0.425331 
4.7.4 Variance decomposition of dealer (RTSM), formal financial institution (RFSM), private lending (RPSM) credit 
market 
From the table 11 dealer credit market variance decomposition can be seen, the effect of economic growth on dealer 
credit market have the obvious time lag effect, the impact in the first two periods are 0.1344% and 0.3906% respectively, 
and rise rapidly to 8.31% in the third period, then stabilize at 8%. The impact of price on dealer credit market show a 
slow upward trend, and stabilize at 4.89% after the fourth period. The scale of formal financial institution and private 
lending will also affect the scale of dealer credit market, and after the fourth period, the contribution rate are at around 
1.65% and 5.03% respectively.  
Table 11.Variance decomposition of RTSM  
lag error RGDP RCPI RM1 RTSM RFSM RPSM 
1 0.047617 0.134377 1.634087 0.178913 98.05262 0.000000 0．00000 
2 0.048942 0.390561 3.060295 0.170084 93.12628 1.467348 1.785432 
3 0.052269 8.318238 4.450042 0.924120 81.69278 1.754846 2.859971 
4 0.053759 8.000040 4.895349 3.073342 77.32894 1.659714 5.042610 
5 0.053844 8.019359 4.883527 3.311912 77.09742 1.654648 5.033139 
6 0.053886 8.006931 4.889932 3.312723 77.10716 1.653733 5.029516 
7 0.053891 8.005821 4.889735 3.319280 77.09897 1.656942 5.029248 
8 0.053895 8.012492 4.893627 3.318733 77.08666 1.656864 5.031624 
9 0.053897 8.013528 4.893820 3.320290 77.08139 1.656888 5.034085 
10 0.053898 8.013755 4.894192 3.321441 77.07966 1.656857 5.034091 
Table12.Variance decomposition of RFSM 
lag Error RGDP RCPI RM1 RTSM RFSM RPSM 
1 2.225729 0.758871 0.379184 0.022677 1.270907 97.56836 0.000000 
2 2.242641 1.112961 0.449416 0.023754 2.129235 96.23067 0.053963 
3 2.549831 1.002274 0.558994 1.538219 2.849108 74.45030 19.60111 
4 2.563814 0.991624 0.686192 1.609721 3.683624 73.64086 19.38798 
5 2.571016 0.987184 0.760091 1.965035 3.747539 73.23100 19.30915 
6 2.572999 1.087638 0.770204 2.000737 3.743121 73.11885 19.27945 
7 2.573855 1.096646 0.771008 2.045237 3.749571 73.07066 19.26687 
8 2.574010 1.096623 0.770930 2.051567 3.750666 73.06195 19.26827 
9 2.574069 1.096827 0.770970 2.051616 3.753718 73.05865 19.26822 
10 2.574076 1.096920 0.770966 2.051721 3.753770 73.05828 19.26835 
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Table 13.Variance decomposition of RPSM 
lag error RGDP RCPI RM1 RTSM RFSM RPSM 
1 0.676287 96.75686 0.063155 0.017825 0.111745 0.005302 3.045110 
2 0.810073 70.88948 3.625286 16.12645 0.086370 0.052954 9.219462 
3 0.823270 68.63575 3.561596 17.13536 0.444880 0.055067 10.16734 
4 0.830027 67.54577 3.536475 16.91322 1.947812 0.054184 10.00254 
5 0.830754 67.47620 3.602008 16.88364 1.989161 0.059648 9.989342 
6 0.831548 67.50371 3.616476 16.85393 1.992039 0.063420 9.970431 
7 0.831960 67.44857 3.620581 16.89298 1.990618 0.064276 9.982978 
8 0.832030 67.43924 3.621084 16.90113 1.991935 0.064293 9.982318 
9 0.832053 67.43572 3.621482 16.90055 1.995590 0.064292 9.982370 
10 0.832057 67.43521 3.621652 16.90079 1.995727 0.064322 9.982296 
Table 12 shows that economic growth and price level have weak influence on the formal financial institution, private 
lending credit market has stronger explanation power, and from the beginning of the fourth period, the contribution of 
private lending credit market on the formal financial institution is about 19.2%. 
Table 13 shows that GDP growth rate and M1 growth rate have greater contribution on the scale of private lending 
credit market. The effect of economic growth on the private lending credit market has a declining trend year by year, the 
contribution of first period is 96.757%, then decrease slightly and contribution rate remain at around 67.5% after the 
fourth period. Price level also have certain effect on the private lending credit market, and remain at around 3.60% after 
the second period. The impact of M1 on private lending credit market at the first period is 0.0178% and after the fourth 
period is about 16.9%. As a result, private lending market is influenced by economic growth mostly, dealer credit 
market secondly, and formal financial institution credit market is almost not affected by economic growth. The reason is 
economic growth will lead to social financing demand increase, but the traditional institution have liquidity limit, 
private lending expand credit scale at the situation of strong demand for investment and financing, therefore, economic 
growth has the greatest effect on the private lending credit market, the least influence on the formal financial institution. 
Price level has a certain contribution on the dealer and private lending shadow credit market, but almost no effect on the 
formal financial institution credit market. M1 growth rate has the largest influence on the private lending credit market, 
stabilize at the fourth period, is about 16.9%, but has weak effect on the dealer and formal financial institution credit 
market. 
5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
This paper firstly define the shadow credit market, divide shadow credit market into the dealer, formal financial 
institution, private lending credit market according to the different participants, and estimate the scale of three types of 
shadow credit market respectively. Based on the monthly data from year 2006 to 2014, through constructing VAR 
model, using Granger Cause tests, impulse response analysis and variance decomposition to study the macroeconomic 
effects of credit shadow credit market financing, we draw the following conclusions: 
First, shadow credit market as the supplement of the traditional credit market, providing liquidity to the market, can 
effectively alleviate the problems of capital chain rupture in small and medium sized enterprises. The development of 
shadow credit market can also promote the financing demand of real economy being satisfied, and stimulate economic 
growth. But the shadow credit market lack of insurance mechanism, have poor capacity to resist risks, which lead to the 
vulnerability of financial system and is not conductive to the steady growth of macro economy. 
Second, the shadow credit market will also impact the monetary policy and price level. Shadow credit market has 
changed the traditional money supply model, increasing the money supply directly. The development of shadow credit 
market has also changed the traditional transmission mechanism of credit and interest rate, affecting the effectiveness of 
monetary policy and even increasing the difficulty of monetary policy regulation mechanism of the central bank. Price 
level is mainly affected by the changes of money supply and credit scale, shadow credit market inject liquidity into 
financial market, expanding the money supply and causing certain disturbance to the price level. 
Third, economic growth and monetary policy will have obvious effect on the development of shadow credit market. The 
credit creation function of shadow credit market can alleviate the problems of small and medium-sized financing 
difficulties and promote economy growth. Meanwhile, the rapid economic growth will increase the financing needs of 
small and medium-sized enterprises, but subject to the bank credit controls, the scale of entrusted loans, trust loans, 
private lending will also expand. 
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The development of shadow credit market in china is still in the embryonic stage. The regulator authorities should 
maintain an objective attitude toward the development of shadow credit market, and improve the regulatory 
environment, strengthen the supervision. Meanwhile, we also need to understand the relationship between shadow 
credit market and economic growth, price level, monetary supply, better play the resource allocation function of shadow 
credit market, and strengthen the effectiveness of monetary policy, making the macroeconomic steady growth.  
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